Ample psychological evidence suggests that people's learning behavior is often prone to a "myside bias" or "irrational belief persistence" in contrast to learning behavior exclusively based on objective data. In the context of Bayesian learning such a bias may result in diverging posterior beliefs and attitude polarization even if agents receive identical information. Such patterns cannot be explained by the standard model of rational Bayesian learning that implies convergent beliefs. As our key contribution, we therefore develop formal models of Bayesian learning with psychological bias as alternatives to rational Bayesian learning. We derive conditions under which beliefs may diverge in the learning process despite the fact that all agents observe the same -arbitrarily large -sample, which is drawn from an "objective"i.i.d. process. Furthermore, one of our learning scenarios results in attitude polarization even in the case of common priors. Key to our approach is the assumption of ambiguous beliefs that are formalized as non-additive probability measures arising in Choquet expected utility theory. As a speci…c feature of our approach, our models of Bayesian learning with psychological bias reduce to rational Bayesian learning in the absence of ambiguity.
Introduction
Several studies in the psychological literature demonstrate that people's learning behavior is prone to e¤ects such as "myside bias" or "irrational belief persistence" (cf., e.g., Baron 2007, Chapter 9) . For instance, in a famous experiment by Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) , subjects supporting and opposing capital punishment were exposed to two purported studies, one con…rming and one discon…rming their existing beliefs about the deterrent e¢ cacy of the death penalty. Despite the fact that both groups received the same information, their learning behavior resulted in an increased "attitude polarization" in the sense that their respective posterior beliefs, either in favor or against the deterrent e¢ cacy of death penalty, further diverged. Analogous results on diverging posterior beliefs in the face of identical information have earlier been reported by Pitz, Downing, and Reinhold (1967) , Pitz (1969) and Chapman (1973) in the context of Bayesian updating of subjective probabilities. In violation of Bayes'update rule the subjects in these experiments formed biased posteriors that supported their original opinions rather than taking into account the evidence. The learning behavior elicited in these experiments cannot be explained by the standard model of rational Bayesian learning according to which di¤erences in agents'prior beliefs must decrease rather than increase whenever the agents receive identical information. In the economics literature, similar phenomena are reported by Kandel and Pearson (1995) who document di¤er-ential interpretation of identical information through public announcements by traders in stock markets. Models of rational Bayesian learning thus apparently ignore relevant aspects of real-life people's learning behavior.
In this paper we present closed-form models of Bayesian learning that allow for the possibility of a "myside bias"as a generalization of a standard rational Bayesian learning model that was introduced to the economics literature by Tonks (1983) , Viscusi and O'Connor (1984) and Viscusi (1985) . As our point of departure we assume that the paradigm of rational Bayesian learning may only be violated by agents who have ambiguous beliefs. That is, the beliefs of these agents cannot be described by additive probability measures alone but additionally re ‡ect the agent's personal attitudes. The impact of new information on an agent's beliefs is then two-fold. On the one hand, we take into account "rational" updating based on objective empirical evidence in accordance with our standard model of rational Bayesian learning. On the other hand, however, we also assume existence of a "myside bias" that results in an "irrational" enforcement of the agents'personal attitudes.
In our formal model a decision maker resolves his uncertainty about the "true" parameter value of a Bernoulli trial, e.g., the probability that a given coin turns up heads, by some prior belief. In contrast to standard models of Bayesian learning, however, we consider a decision maker who is ambiguous whereby we formally describe ambiguity by non-additive probability measures, i.e., capacities, that arise in Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) theory (Schmeidler 1986 (Schmeidler ,1989 Gilboa 1987) .
1 A decision maker's prior estimate of the parameter is then given as the Choquet expected value of possible parametervalues with respect to such ambiguous beliefs. In order to focus our analysis, we further restrict attention to neo-additive capacities in the sense of Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2007) according to which an agent's non-additive belief about the likelihood of an event is a weighted average of an ambiguous part and an additive part. More speci…cally, we assume that the additive part of the neo-additive capacity is described by some distribution of the Beta-distributions family. Under these assumptions, the decision maker's prior belief about the true parameter value is a weighted average of the ambiguous part and the expected value of the Beta-distribution. According to our interpretation, the expected value of this Beta-distribution is the decision maker's best rational guess about the "true"value of the parameter. The ambiguous part of his prior belief is relevant whenever the agent lacks absolute con…dence in this guess. This lack of con…dence is resolved in our model by a parameter that measures the agent's optimistic versus pessimistic personal attitudes with respect to ambiguity.
In a next step we analyze how the decision maker revises his prior belief in light of new information about the outcomes of i.i.d. Bernoulli trials. To this end we consider a decision maker who uses some Bayesian update rule to generate a conditional nonadditive probability measure so that his posterior estimate about the parameter is given as the Choquet expected value with respect to this posterior capacity. In the case of non-additive probability measures there exist several perceivable Bayesian update rules expressing di¤erent psychological attitudes towards the interpretation of new information (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993; Sarin and Wakker 1998) . In particular, we analyze the consequences of the so-called full Bayesian (Pires 2002; Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey 2006; Siniscalchi 2001 Siniscalchi , 2006 as well as the optimistic and the pessimistic update rules (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993; Sarin and Wakker 1998 ). An application of these update rules to some prior belief where the agent expresses ambiguity results in a Bayesian learning process that di¤ers from rational Bayesian learning in that convergence to the "true" probabilities of some objective random process will -in general -not emerge. Rather, updating of beliefs reinforces optimistic, respectively pessimistic, attitudes of the agent thereby giving rise to learning behavior with a "myside bias".
Using this Bayesian learning model we then analyze the beliefs of two heterogeneous agents who have some prior beliefs, receive identical information and then update their beliefs according to some Bayesian update rule with psychological bias. Thereby, we di¤erentiate between a weak and a strong form of myside bias. The weak form of myside bias is characterized by diverging posterior beliefs of the agents under repeated learning with identical information whereby the beliefs may move into the same direction. According to our interpretation the strong form of myside bias is equivalent to attitude polarization in the sense that the posterior estimates of the two agents move into opposite directions under repeated learning with identical information. To derive our main results we then consider two scenarios: In our …rst scenario the two agents have di¤erent initial beliefs and update their beliefs based on the same information by applying the same update rule. In our second scenario, the two agents receive the same information but apply di¤erent update rules. In both scenarios the resulting posterior beliefs may exhibit the weak as well as the strong form of myside bias. Notice that, in order to derive our result in the second scenario, we do not require that the agents have di¤erent prior beliefs.
The remainder of our analysis is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related literature. Section 3 presents our benchmark model of Bayesian learning with non-ambiguous beliefs and Section 4 introduces ambiguous beliefs. Section 5 discusses updating of ambiguous beliefs under the three di¤erent update rules -full Bayesian, optimistic and pessimistic updating -that we consider in this paper. In Section 6 we derive, under the assumption of Bayesian learning, long-run limit estimates that, in general, do not converge to true probabilities. Section 7 then presents our main results on weak and strong myside bias in the form of diverging beliefs and attitude polarization. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
Learning with additive beliefs
In our learning model agents revise their probability assessments about the parameters of some stochastic process, e.g., about the probability that a given coin turns up heads or tails, by Bayesian updating. Accordingly, agents have some prior beliefs and form posterior beliefs given the relative frequencies observed in the data. In contrast, according to the frequentist approach, agents learn probabilities by simply adopting relative frequencies observed in a given data sample. Within the frequentist approach, divergence of probability assessments of agents cannot occur if the data are drawn from a stationary stochastic process. Against this background, Kurz ( ,b, 1996 assumes a non-stationary stochastic process and thereby establishes conditions under which agents may not agree about fundamentals in the long run even if they observe the same data sample. However, the application of a frequentist learning rule in a non-stationary environment is not fully consistent because the rationale for agents to apply a frequentist rule for inferring probabilities when the "underlying" probabilities cannot be learnt by this rule is not clear.
2
While divergence of beliefs can thus not occur within the frequentist framework in a stationary environment, a similar observation holds true within the Bayesian framework when restricted to additive beliefs. Part of our analysis below is based on a speci…c model of Bayesian learning with additive beliefs according to which the agents'uncertainty with respect to the parameter of a Binomial distribution is described by a Beta-distribution. The fact that additive posteriors converge to the same limit belief in this model, however, can be regarded as a special case of more general results on the consistency of (additive) Bayesian estimates, in particular Doob's consistency theorem (Doob 1949 ; for extensions see Breiman, LeCam, and Schwartz 1964; Lijoi, Pruenster, and Walker 2004) . We next brie ‡y review some relevant convergence results.
Formally, consider a sequence of coordinate random variables (X n ) n 1 on some measurable space (S 1 ; S 1 ) taking values in some complete separable metric space S.
In particular, let S 1 = 1 i=1 S and let S 1 denote the Borel -algebra generated by X 1 ; X 2 ; :::. Further consider a family of additive (conditional) probability measures fQ ( j ) j 2 g on the space (S; S) with S denoting the Borel -algebra in S. We interpret the complete separable metric space as the set of possible parameter values and we assume that 7 ! Q ( j ) is one-one. For given , we denote by Q 1 ( j ) the product measure on (S 1 ; S 1 ). Let B denote the Borel -algebra in and de…ne = S 1 and F = B S 1 for the standard product -algebra. If is an additive probability measure on ( ; B), then the additive probability measure P on ( ; F) is uniquely de…ned by
for any B 2 B and A = A 1 ::: A n S 1 2 S 1 for any n. The probability measure stands here for the agent's prior (distribution) of the S 1 -measurable random variablẽ which captures the agent's uncertainty about the true parameter value. The agent's posterior (distribution) of~ given the observation, i.e., data, X n (!) = X 1 (!) ::: X n (!) is then, by Bayes'rule, de…ned as the conditional probability measure
for any B 2 B if the denominator is not zero. The pair ( ; ( j X n )) is said to be consistent i¤, for Q 1 ( j )-almost all sequences of observations, the posterior ( j X n ) converges in the weak topology to a probability measure putting probability mass one on every neighborhood of . That is, if the Bayesian posterior ( j X n ) is consistent for a given parameter value then the Bayesian estimate for , de…ned by the conditional expected value E [~ j ( j X n )], converges with probability one to as n gets large. According to Doob's consistency theorem (1949) , the pair ( ; ( j X n )) is consistent for -almost all values in . Thus, only for parameter values in a subset of with prior probability of zero the Bayesian estimate may not converge to the true parameter value. Moreover, Freedman (1963) establishes for …nite S that ( ; ( j X n )) is consistent if and only if is in the support of the prior . As a consequence, if the random variables X 1 ; X 2 ; ::: can take on only …nitely many values, an agent's Bayesian estimate will almost surely converge to the true parameter value if his prior has full support on .
Related to Doob's consistency theorem is Blackwell and Dubins'(1962) convergence theorem. While this convergence theorem does not explicitly refer to Bayesian posteriors, it is relevant to the literature on attitude polarization because it investigates convergence of two sequences of conditional probabilities that start out from di¤erent initial points. More speci…cally, Blackwell and Dubins consider two di¤erent additive probability measures P and P 0 on the measurable space (S 1 ; S 1 ) as de…ned above. According to Blackwell and Dubins, if these two agents agree on all events with probability zero, the two conditional probability measures P ( j X n ) ; P 0 ( j X n ) almost surely merge in the absolute variation norm. That is, if two agents start out with di¤erent beliefs about the probability that governs the process (X n ) n 1 , their conditional probabilities about future events, i.e., P (X n+1 X n+2 ::: j X n ) and P 0 (X n+1 X n+2 ::: j X n ), almost surely merge as n gets large. Diaconis and Freedman (1986, Theorem 3) establish a formal link between Doob's consistency theorem and Blackwell and Dubins' convergence theorem by basically showing that the Bayesian posterior ( j X n ) is consistent if and only if the conditional probability measures P ( j X n ) ; P 0 ( j X n ) merge in the weak topology for any P 0 .
In light of the above convergence results it is practically impossible to establish (at least for a …nite set S) attitude polarization, or even non-converging posteriors, within the framework of Bayesian learners with additive beliefs if all agents observe the same sample information drawn from an i.i.d. process. In order to account for the empirical phenomenon of non-converging posteriors or/and attitude polarization, however, several authors have tried to circumvent these convergence results within the framework of Bayesian learning with additive beliefs. One approach is to restrict attention to the possibility of a short-run bias only, thereby deliberately ignoring long-run convergence (e.g., Brav and Heaton 2002; Dixit and Weibull 2007) . Another line of research is to look into the possibility of weakening the i.i.d. assumption of the above framework. E.g., Lewellen and Shanken (2002) consider cases in which the mean of an exogenous dividend process may not be constant over time. Consequently, the agent can never fully learn the objective parameters of the underlying distribution because observed frequencies do not admit any conclusions about objective probabilities even in the long run. Along the same line, Weitzman (2007) considers a non-stationary exogenous stochastic process so that there is no "true" parameter that could be learnt by the agents. Furthermore, within the context of attitude polarization, Kandel and Pearson (1995) and, more recently, Acemoglu, Chernozhukov and Yildiz (2007) consider two agents with di¤erent priordistributions about imprecise signals from an i.i.d. process. Since these di¤erent priors imply di¤erent interpretation of new information, these authors avoid convergence of both agents'posteriors according to Doob's consistency theorem because these posteriors are e¤ectively formed by observing two di¤erent stochastic processes.
Learning under ambiguity
While the above approaches try -in one way or another -to reconcile the possibility of attitude polarization with Bayesian learning under the assumption of additive beliefs, our approach drops the assumption of additive beliefs altogether. As a consequence, Doob's consistency theorem does not apply in our framework so that agents'non-additive posteriors may diverge in the long-run despite the fact that they observe the same data drawn from an i.i.d. process. Moreover, our approach may even allow for diverging posteriors and attitude polarization in the case that agents start out with identical priors. This is impossible for models of Bayesian learning with additive beliefs because additivity implies a unique Bayesian update rule.
Related to our approach, Marinacci (1999) studies a learning environment with nonadditive beliefs whereby he considers a decision maker who observes an experiment such that the outcomes at each trial are identically and independently distributed with respect to the decision-maker's non-additive belief.
3 In this setup, Marinacci derives for (basically convex) capacities laws of large numbers as counterparts to the additive case thereby admitting for the possibility that ambiguity does not vanish in the long-run. While Marinacci's approach may thus be regarded as a frequentist approach towards non-additive probabilities, our approach is a Bayesian one according to which an agent has a subjective prior belief over the whole event space while he uses sample information from an objective process in order to update his subjective belief. In contrast to our approach the learning behavior of di¤erent agents in Marinacci's model must converge to the same limit if they have identical priors. As a consequence there cannot occur attitude polarization within Marinacci's framework under the assumption of common priors. Epstein and Schneider (2007) also consider a model of learning under ambiguity which shares with our learning model the feature that ambiguity does not necessarily vanish in the long run. Their learning model is based on the recursive multiple priors approach (Epstein and Wang 1994; Epstein and Schneider 2003) that restricts conditional max min expected utility (MMEU) preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) such that dynamic consistency is satis…ed. While MMEU theory is closely related to CEU theory restricted to convex capacities (e.g., neo-additive capacities for which the degree of optimism is zero), the similarity between Epstein and Schneider's approach and our learning model ends here. As one main di¤erence, the restriction of Epstein and Schneider's approach to dynamically consistent preferences excludes preferences that violate Savage's sure-thing principle as elicited in Ellsberg paradoxes (cf. observation 3 in this paper). Since our learning model does not exclude dynamically inconsistent decision behavior, it can accommodate a broader notion of ambiguity attitudes than the Epstein-Schneider approach, including ambiguity attitudes that are not compatible with the sure-thing principle. Furthermore, Epstein and Schneider establish long-run ambiguity, i.e., the existence of multiple posteriors, under the assumption that the decision-maker permanently receives ambiguous signals, which they formalize via a multitude of di¤erent likelihood functions at each information stage in addition to the existence of multiple priors. 4 This introduction of multiple likelihoods is rather ad hoc and it would be interesting to see an axiomatic or/and psychological foundation of this approach which goes beyond the mere technical property that multiple likelihoods can sustain long-run ambiguity in the recursive multiple priors framework. On the contrary, our -comparably simple -axiomatically founded model of Bayesian learning with psychological attitudes o¤ers a rather straightforward explanation for biased long-run beliefs even in the case the capacity . 4 In the case of learning from ambiguous urns without multiple likelihoods, ambiguity obviously vanishes in the learning process; (for a formal result see Marinachi 2002).
8 that the decision-maker receives signals that are not ambiguous.
The benchmark case: Rational Bayesian learning
In this section we describe in detail a closed-form learning model with additive beliefs as introduced to the economics literature by Viscusi and O'Connor (1984) and Viscusi (1985) . Consider the situation of an agent who is uncertain about the probability of an outcome, H, but can observe a statistical experiment with n independent trials where H, resp. T , is a possible outcome that occurs identical probability. Formally, we consider a sequence of coordinate random variables (X n ) n 1 on the measurable space (S 1 ; S 1 ) taking on values in S = f0; 1g which count how many times outcome H occurs in the trial. Let S 1 = 1 i=1 S and de…ne S 1 as the power-set of S 1 . Our parameter space is ( ; B) such that = [0; 1] is endowed with the Euclidean metric and B denotes the Borel -algebra in . As family of additive (conditional) probability measures fQ ( j ) j 2 g on the space (S; S) with S = 2 S we consider the family of
Bernoulli distributions
We further assume that the agent's prior of~ is given by some Beta distribution, which is, for given parameters ; > 0, characterized by the density function
where K ; is a normalizing constant.
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Observe now that the joint-probability measure P on ( ; F) with = S 1 and F = B S 1 is uniquely de…ned by
for any B 2 B and A = A 1 ::: A n S 1 2 S 1 for any n. For our purpose it is convenient to denote by the event in F such that 2 is the true probability of outcome H, i.e., = f! 2 j~ (!) = g .
Similarly, let I k n denote the event in F such that outcome H has occurred k-times in the n …rst trials. That is,
whereby the S n -measurable random variableĨ n counts the number of occurrences of H.
Since the probability of receiving information I k n for a given (=likelihood function) is in our i.i.d. Bernoulli-trial framework
we obtain by Bayes'rule the following posterior probability (density) that is the true value given information
The agent's prior estimate for the true probability of H is given by the expected value of his prior on~ , i.e., E [~ ; ]. Accordingly, the agent's posterior estimate for given information I 
where k n is the sample mean. That is, the agent's posterior estimate for the probability of H is a weighted average of his prior estimate and the sample mean whereby the weight attached to the sample mean increases in the number of trials.
6 Let denote the "true" probability of outcome H. If the number of trials approaches in…nity, i.e., n ! 1, the sample mean information I k n converges in probability to the sample information I according to which outcome H has occurred with relative frequency . That is, for every c > 0, lim n!1 prob I k n c = 1. As a consequence, we obtain the following consistency result for this speci…c model of Bayesian learning with additive beliefs.
Observation 1: The posterior estimates E ~ ; j I k n for the probability of outcome H converge in probability to the true probability as n gets large.
Apparently, this standard model of rational Bayesian learning cannot account for the learning behavior of agents whose posterior beliefs systematically diverge while they receive the same sample information drawn from an i.i.d. process.
Remark. Observe that if the agent's information I k n about the sample mean is always precise in the sense that I k n = k n for all n, the limit information I equals some point in the unit-interval, implying (I ) = 0 by the de…nition of a Beta-distribution. A more interesting (and general) case would be to allow for imprecise information about the sample mean, e.g.,
1] so that we may have (I ) 0 since, e.g., I = [ " ; + " ] with " 0. If, in addition, the agent's estimate about the sample mean, say E x k n ; ' k n (where ' k n is some subjective probability distribution for the random variable x k n with support on I k n ), always coincides with the true samplemean , i.e., E x k n ; ' k n = k n for all n, the limit results of observation 1 would identically apply to this learning scenario with imprecise information. In the remainder of the paper we will henceforth admit for the case that 0 (I ) < 1 while E [~ ; ( j I )] = is nevertheless satis…ed with probability one
Ambiguous beliefs
We assume that individuals exhibit ambiguity attitudes in the sense of Schmeidler (1989) and who may thus, for example, commit paradoxes of the Ellsberg type (Ellsberg 1961) . Following Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987) , we describe such individuals as Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) decision makers, that is, they maximize expected utility with respect to non-additive beliefs. Properties of non-additive beliefs are used in the literature for formal de…nitions of, e.g., ambiguity and uncertainty attitudes (Schmeidler 1989; Epstein 1999; Ghirardato and Marinacchi 2002) , pessimism and optimism (Eichberger and Kelsey 1999; Wakker 2001; Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant 2006) , as well as sensitivity to changes in likelihood (Wakker 2004) . The Choquet expected value of a bounded random variable Y : ! R with respect to capacity is formally de…ned as the following Riemann integral extended to domain (Schmeidler 1986 ):
Our own approach focuses on non-additive beliefs that are de…ned as neo-additive capacities in the sense of Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2007) .
De…nition. For a given measurable space ( ; F) the neo-additive capacity, , is de…ned, for some ; 2 [0; 1] by
for all A 2 F such that is some additive probability measure and we have for the non-additive capacities
and ! p respectively
The following observation extends a result (Lemma 3.1) of Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) for …nite random variables to the more general case of random variables with a closed and bounded support.
Observation 2. Let Y be a closed and bounded random variable. Then the Choquet expected value (2) of Y with respect to a neo-additive capacity (3) is given by
Proof: Relegated to the appendix.
Neo-additive capacities can be interpreted as non-additive beliefs that stand for deviations from additive beliefs such that a parameter (degree of ambiguity) measures the lack of con…dence the decision maker has in some subjective additive probability distribution . Obviously, if there is no ambiguity, i.e., = 0, (4) reduces to the standard subjective expected utility representation of Savage (1954) . In case there is some ambiguity, however, the second parameter measures how much weight the decision maker puts on the best possible outcome of Y when resolving his ambiguity. Conversely, (1 ) is the weight he puts on the worst possible outcome of Y . As a consequence, we interpret as an "optimism under ambiguity" parameter whereby = 1, resp. = 0, corresponds to extreme optimism, resp. extreme pessimism, with respect to resolving ambiguity in the decision maker's belief.
Finally, observe that for non-degenerate events, i.e., A = 2 f;; g, the neo-additive capacity in (3), simpli…es to
5 Updating ambiguous beliefs CEU theory has been developed in order to accommodate paradoxes of the Ellsberg type which show that real-life decision-makers violate Savage's sure-thing principle.
In this section we demonstrate that abandoning the sure-thing principle bears two important implications for conditional CEU preferences over Savage-acts. First, in contrast to Bayesian updating of additive probability measures, there exist several perceivable Bayesian update rules for non-additive probability measures (cf. Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993 , Sarin and Wakker 1998 , Pires 2002 , Eichberger, Grant and Kelsey 2006 , Siniscalchi 2001 , 2006 . Second, any preferences that (strictly) violate the sure-thing principle cannot be updated in a dynamically consistent way. That is, there does not exist any updating rule for capacities such that ex-ante CEU preferences that (strictly) violate the sure-thing principle are updated in a dynamically consistent manner to ex-post CEU preferences. To see this de…ne the Savage-act f B h : ! X such that
where B is some non-empty event. Recall that Savage's sure-thing principle states that, for all acts f; g; h; h 0 and all events B 2 F,
Let us interpret event B as new information received by the agent. The sure-thing principle then implies a straightforward way for deriving ex-post preferences B , conditional on the new information B, from the agent's original preferences over Savage-acts. Namely, we have f B g if and only if f B h g B h for any h,
implying for a subjective EU decision-maker
where u : X ! R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and ( j B) is a conditional additive probability measure de…ned, for all A; B 2 F such that (B) > 0, by
.
It is well known that the updating of EU preferences satis…es dynamic consistency, which -informally -states that there are no strict ex-post incentives for deviating from an ex-ante optimal plan of actions. Formally, we de…ne dynamic consistency in terms of update rules, i.e., rules that derive conditional preferences, f B g for all events B, from an ex-ante preference ordering .
De…nition: Dynamic Consistency. We speak of a dynamically consistent update rule i¤ for all ("information") partitions P F and all Savage-acts f; g, f B g for all B 2 P implies f g.
Observation 3. There does not exist any dynamically consistent update rule for preferences that strictly violate the sure-thing principle.
Proof: For preferences that strictly violate the sure-thing principle we have, for some f and g, f B h g B h and g B h 0 f B h 0 for some h 6 = h 0 and some B.
Observe that any update rule for preferences must result in conditional preferences f B g or g B f . Consider at …rst the case f B g. Since h In case the sure-thing principle does not hold, the speci…cation of act h in (7) is no longer arbitrary so that there exist for CEU preferences several possibilities of deriving ex post preferences from ex ante preferences. That is, in a CEU framework there exist several perceivable ways of de…ning a conditional capacity ( j B) such that
Let us at …rst consider conditional CEU preferences satisfying, for all acts f; g,
where h is the so-called conditional certainty equivalent of g, i.e., h is the constant act such that g B h. The corresponding Bayesian update rule for the non-additive beliefs of a CEU decision maker is the so-called full Bayesian update rule which is given as follows (Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey 2006) 
where F B (A j B) denotes the conditional capacity for event A 2 F given information cell B 2 P.
Observation 4: An application of the full Bayesian update rule (8) to a prior belief (5) results in the posterior belief=0
such that
In addition to the full Bayesian update rule we also consider so-called h-Bayesian update rules for preferences over Savage acts as introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) . That is, we consider some collection of conditional preference orderings, 
where h = (x ; E; x ; :E) ;
with x denoting the best and x denoting the worst consequence possible and E 2 F. For the so-called optimistic update rule h is the constant act where E = ;. That is, under the optimistic update rule the null-event, :B, becomes associated with the worst consequence possible. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) 
Observation 5: An application of the optimistic update rule (13) Proof: Relegated to the appendix.
For the pessimistic (or Dempster-Shafer) update rule h is the constant act where E = , associating with the null-event,:B, the best consequence possible. The psychological interpretation for this update rule according to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) is as follows: "[...] we consider a 'pessimistic' decision maker, whose choices reveal the hidden assumption that all the impossible worlds are the best conceivable ones."
The corresponding pessimistic Bayesian update rule for CEU decision makers is Proof: Relegated to the appendix.
Remark. Observe that the conditions (14) and (16) are consistency conditions which ensure that the denominator in the according conditional capacity is not zero so that the conditional capacities are well-de…ned. In the remainder of the paper we will assume that (14) and (16) hold without explicitly mentioning it. To see the intuition behind these consistency conditions notice that (14), resp. (16), states that extremely pessimistic, resp. optimistic, priors should not be updated by the optimistic, resp. pessimistic, rule.
Learning with ambiguous beliefs
In this section we formally link the updating of ambiguous beliefs to Bayesian learning behavior. As a generalization of the Bayesian learning model discussed in Section 3, we consider now a neo-additive prior about the unknown parameter such that
i.e., the additive part of this prior is some Beta-distribution. Accordingly, the agent's prior estimate for the true value of is now given as the Choquet expected value of his neo-additive prior, i.e.,
by observation 2 and the fact that~ has full support on [0; 1]. The following lemma uses our results (observations 4-6) on Bayesian updating of neo-additive capacities in order to derive conditional neo-additive capacities for the special case (17). The corresponding conditional Choquet expected values stand for the agent's posterior estimate of the "true"probability of outcome H.
Lemma. Suppose the agent receives sample information I k n 2 B S. Contingent on the applied update rule we obtain the following conditional neo-additive beliefs and posterior estimates about parameter whereby E ~ ; j I k n is given by (1).
(i) Full Bayesian updating.
(ii) Optimistic Bayesian updating.
(iii) Pessimistic Bayesian updating.
In the limit of a Bayesian learning process the agent's posterior estimates about will then converge to E [~ ; ( j I )], whose value depends on the applied Bayesian update rule. The following corollary to the above lemma characterizes these limit estimates. Thereby, we use the fact that the additive part of the neo-additive beliefs converges in probability to the true probability , i.e.,
for some c > 0.
Corollary. Let n ! 1. Contingent on the applied update rule the agent's estimates about the probability of outcome H converge in probability to the following posterior estimates.
(i) Full Bayesian learning.
(ii) Optimistic Bayesian learning.
(iii) Pessimistic Bayesian learning.
Consider the situation that di¤erent learners start out with identical neo-additive priors. The following result formally con…rms our intuition that a pessimistic learner will end up with a smaller posterior estimate about than a full Bayesian learner who in turn ends up with a smaller posterior estimate than an optimistic learner. Furthermore, while an optimistic (pessimistic) learner will always overestimate (underestimate) the true probability of the i.i.d. process, a full Bayesian learner will overestimate (underestimate) this true probability if and only if it is smaller (greater) than his original degree of optimism.
Observation 7: Suppose that > 0 and 2 (0; 1). Then
Moreover, with respect to any "true" probability 2 (0; 1) we have for these limit estimates
Diverging posteriors and attitude polarization
We are now ready to state and prove our main results whereby we suppose that agents have received the same (limit) sample information from the statistical experiment. To focus our analysis we only consider interesting di¤erences between the agents'learning behavior. In particular, we di¤erentiate between two relevant cases of heterogenous learning behavior. On the one hand, we consider full Bayesian learners who have di¤er-ent initial attitudes with respect to optimism under ambiguity implying di¤erent prior beliefs. On the other hand, we consider agents who may have identical prior beliefs but have di¤erent, i.e., optimistic resp. pessimistic, attitudes with respect to the interpretation of new information. Formally, consider a set of agents, I, such that, for every agent i 2 I, the prior about the parameter is given by
For the sake of expositional clarity, we restrict attention to the case in which di¤erences in initial beliefs of agents can only be due to their respective optimism parameters i , i 2 I, under ambiguity.
Assumption 1. The priors of all agents i 2 I satisfy i = , i = , and i = for some parameter values ; ; .
By the following assumption we restrict attention to the interesting case of nondegenerate objective probabilities.
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Assumption 2. The "true" probability is non-degenerate, i.e., 2 (0; 1).
As our …rst main result (proposition 1) we identify conditions under which posterior beliefs diverge such that the directed distance between the posterior beliefs of the two agents is strictly greater than the directed distance between their priors. That is, our …rst result refers to diverging posteriors in the following sense.
De…nition (Diverging Posteriors). Let I = f1; 2g. We say that both agents' posteriors strictly diverge i¤
According to our concept of strictly diverging posteriors, the repeated learning of identical information will widen any initial gap in prior beliefs whereby the posteriors may move in the same direction. We also refer to this divergence in beliefs as a weak form of myside bias.
Proposition 1. (Diverging Posteriors)
Let I = f1; 2g and suppose that assumptions 1 and 2 are satis…ed. (ii) Assume that agent 1 is an optimistic whereas agent 2 is a pessimistic Bayesian learner. Then the agents'posteriors strictly diverge if and only if > 0 and 1 2 .
Our second main result (proposition 2) focuses on conditions that ensure attitude polarization. Attitude polarization in our sense is a stronger concept than mere divergence of posteriors in that it additionally requires that the posteriors move in opposite directions. We also refer to this divergence in beliefs as a strong form of myside bias. Formally, we consider the following de…nition of attitude polarization.
De…nition (Attitude Polarization). Let I = f1; 2g. We say that both agents' attitudes become strictly polarized i¤
In order to further focus our analysis we restrict attention to the case in which the additive part of the prior estimate coincides with the objective probability. 
Proposition 2. (Attitude Polarization I)
Let I = f1; 2g and suppose that assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satis…ed.
(i) Assume that both agents are full Bayesian learners. Then the agents'attitudes become strictly polarized if and only if 2 (0; 1), 1 > 2 , and
(ii) Assume that agent 1 is an optimistic whereas agent 2 is a pessimistic Bayesian learner. Then the agents' attitudes become strictly polarized if and only if > 0 and 1 2 .
Our formal de…nitions of "diverging posteriors"and "attitude polarization"capture the idea that the agents'posteriors diverge rather than converge despite the fact that they receive the same information. The results of propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that this weak, respectively strong, form of a myside bias may occur in di¤erent learning scenarios. While the results of propositions 1(i) and 2(i) are driven by the initial gap in prior beliefs, the results of propositions 1(ii) and 2(ii) build upon the di¤erent learning rules of the agents. According to condition (21) attitude polarization for full Bayesian learners rather occurs if the di¤erence in initial beliefs is large, i.e., strong optimism of agent 1 versus strong pessimism of agent 2. Such a di¤erence in prior beliefs is not necessary for attitude polarization in case the agents apply di¤erent learning rules. That is, even agents with common priors may experience diverging posteriors and attitude polarization if they interpret new information di¤erently.
Finally, the following proposition shows that whenever full Bayesian learners express attitude polarization, the magnitude of attitude polarization between an optimistic and a pessimistic learner will be even more signi…cant. This (intuitive) result is an immediate consequence of observation 7.
Proposition 3. (Attitude Polarization II)
Let I = f1; :::; 4g and suppose that assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satis…ed whereby we have for the agents'priors
Further assume that agents 1 and 2 are full Bayesian learners whereas agent 3 is an optimistic and agent 4 is a pessimistic Bayesian learner. If the attitudes of agents 1 and 2 become strictly polarized, then the attitudes of agents 3 and 4 are even more polarized, i.e.,
Conclusion
To account for the empirical phenomena of "myside bias" and "irrational belief persistence" in people's learning behavior we propose formal models of Bayesian learning where the interpretation of new information is prone to psychological biases. Based on a simpli…ed representation of ambiguous beliefs we develop parsimonious representations of the agent's initial beliefs and updating processes. We thereby focus attention on three alternative updating rules that are characterized by di¤erent degrees of optimism, respectively pessimism, in the interpretation of new information. As a speci…c feature of our approach, the resulting models of Bayesian learning with psychological attitudes reduce to a standard model of rational Bayesian learning in the absence of ambiguity. However, we show that this standard model of rational Bayesian learning alone results in convergent beliefs and is therefore not a suitable framework to account for phenomena such as a myside bias. We then develop a two heterogeneous agents setting to derive divergent posterior beliefs and attitude polarization for the agents' learning processes under ambiguity. Attitude polarization is de…ned as a stronger condition than divergent beliefs in that the posterior beliefs of the two agents move into opposite directions. While we assume that the agents receive the same information, the agents may have di¤erent prior beliefs or apply di¤erent learning rules. Two main …ndings emerge:
1. We may observe divergent posterior beliefs and attitude polarization for agents who have identical attitudes with respect to the interpretation of new information but have di¤erent initial attitudes with respect to optimism, resp. pessimism, under ambiguity.
2. We may observe divergent posterior beliefs and attitude polarization in case the agents have identical initial attitudes with respect to optimism, resp. pessimism, under ambiguity but have di¤erent attitudes with respect to the interpretation of new information.
Our stylized models of Bayesian thus formally accommodate two alternative scenarios of a "myside bias". In a …rst scenario, a "myside bias" arises because of personal attitudes towards the resolution of ambiguity. In a second scenario, a "myside bias" corresponds to personal attitudes towards the interpretation of information. While the psychological studies quoted in the introduction provide empirical evidence for the phenomenon of attitude polarization, they cannot di¤erentiate between these two alternative explanations for the phenomenon. It would therefore be interesting to gather more empirical evidence on updating and learning with non-additive beliefs. In this respect, our formal model may be useful for designing experiments that speci…cally look at the issue of Bayesian updating of ambiguous beliefs.
In future research we aim to apply our approach to topics in information economics that are typically analyzed under the assumption of rational Bayesian learning such as …ctitious play in strategic games (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Kreps 1993; Fudenberg and Levine 1995; Krishna and Sjostrom 1998) or no-trade results (see, e.g., Milgrom and Stokey 1982; Morris 1994; Neeman 1996; Zimper 2007) . Along the line of heterogeneous agent models that depart from the rational expectations or rational Bayesian learning paradigms, our approach may also have promising implications for asset pricing models (see, e.g., Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark 2000; Abel 2002; Ludwig and Zimper 2007) and theories of endogenous speculative bubbles (see, e.g., the discussion in Kurz 1996) .
which is equivalent to
since Y is closed and bounded. We consider a partition P n , n = 1; 2; :::, of with members A k n = f! 2 j a k;n < X (!) b k;n g for k = 1; :::; 2 n such that
De…ne the step functions a n : ! R and b n : ! R such that, for ! 2 A k n , k = 1; :::; 2 n , a n (!) = a k;n
Obviously,
for all n and lim
That is, E [a n ; ] and E [b n ; ] converge to E [Y; ] for n ! 1. Furthermore, observe that min a n = min Y for all n, and max b n = max Y for all n.
Since lim n!1 min b n = lim n!1 min a n and E [b n ; ] is continuous in n, we have This proves the …rst part of the observation. The second part readily follows from the assumption that (I ) < 1. Observe that these inequalities require 2 (0; 1) since 2 f0; 1g would imply
